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SUICIDAL RIGHTS
Michael Ariens*
It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First,
because everything naturally loves itself. . . . Wherefore suicide is con-
trary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should
love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the
natural law and to charity.
Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now
every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the
community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the
Philosopher declares.
Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power,
Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against
God. .. .'
Has not everyone, of consequence, the free disposal of his own life?
And may he not lawfully employ that power with which nature has
endowed him? In order to destroy the evidence of this conclusion, we must
show a reason why this particular case is excepted; is it because human life
is of so great importance, that 'tis a presumption for human prudence to
dispose of it? But the life of a man is of no greater importance to the
universe than that of an oyster.
A man who retires from life does no harm to society; he only ceases to
do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest kind. All our obligations to
do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the benefits
of society and therefore ought to promote its interests, but when I withdraw
myself altogether from society, can I be bound any longer?2
* Assistant Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. B.A.
1979, St. Norbert College; J.D. 1982, Marquette University; LL.M. 1987, Harvard
University. My thanks to my colleagues, Vicki Mather and Mark Cochran, for their
thorough readings and suggestions.
1. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, I! SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q64 art. 5 (Benzinger Bros., Inc.
1947)
2. Hume, On Suicide, reprinted in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 107,109 (T.
Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1986). An interesting view of Hume is found in 0. SACKS, THE
MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 119 (1985), in
which the author, a neurologist, discussed the case of a person suffering from Tourett's
Syndrome, and said, "[Flor Hume, personal identity is a fiction - we do not exist, we are
but a consecution of sensations, or perceptions." Id. at 119.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A paradox of liberal political thought in the United States may be best
expressed by those not of it. The "debate" between Aquinas and Hume
informs the terrain to be surveyed in appraising the ethical and moral
precepts concerning a "right" to commit suicide.3 In a markedly legalistic
society like the United States, it also aids in organizing the legal responses
to suicidal acts and attempts. Like most ethical issues presently con-
fronting the people of the United States, a solution is sought by resort to
courts of law.'
This legal debate requires a critical review of the relationship between
the individual and the community in present liberal political thought.
Modern liberal political thought postulates that the government or
community must be neutral about what is good for both members of the
community and the community itself.5 It also postulates that there exists a
sphere of action which affects solely an individual. That is, there exists a
boundary in which certain actions will harm only oneself rather than
others.6 The neutrality postulate and the harm of self/harm to others
dichotomy are best explicated by John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty:
3. One example which indicates that the structure of the debate remains remarkably
similar is found in Symposium, Aiding a Suicide Attempt, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 72, 72-79
(1985). Compare Finnis, Legal Enforcement of Duties to Oneself: Kant v. Neo-Kantians,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1987) with Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle: A
Reply to John Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1987).
4. See Handler, Social Dilemmas, Judicial [Irresolutions, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. I
(1987) (discussing, among other social dilemmas, what New Jersey Supreme Court Justice
Handler calls "right to die" cases).
5. Whether that particular kind of political thought called liberalism requires a
neutral conception of the good life is deeply disputed. Compare R. Dworkin, Liberalism,
reprinted in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1986); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 446-52 (1971) (liberal
theorists arguing that liberalism requires a neutral conception of the good life) with
Teachout, The Burden of the Liberal Song, 62 IND. L.J. 1283 (1987); West, Liberalism
Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673
(1985); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103
(1984) (liberal scholars arguing that liberalism, properly understood, does not require that
the state have a neutral conception of the good life). Critics have also attacked liberalism for
its purported neutral conception of the good life. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
(1984); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1976); Horwitz, Republicanism and
Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987);
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
It is my view that, regardless of the answer to this question, there is an understanding of
liberalism in constitutional law adjudication as atomistic individualism. This is in contrast
to the communitarian vision found in areas outside of constitutional law.
6. Of course, in this post-realist age, the idea has taken a beating from critics. See, e.g.,
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF LAW
[Vol. 20:79
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That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of
others, to do so would be wise or even right.7
Mill's separation and categorization of the individual and the community
has animated much of constitutional law discourse over the past twenty-
five years. In fact, the dichotomy has become an archetype for structuring a
number of important constitutional law decisions. The explicit adoption of
a constitutional right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut8 and its
expansion in Roe v. Wade9 is an affirmation of the Millian paradigm in
constitutional law."° In tort law, criminal law and other nonconstitutional
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construc-
tion and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (1984).
An excellent essay concerning the need for some boundaries in constitutional law is
Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987). Cf Spann, Secret
Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1987).
7. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (ch. 1, para. 9) (M. Fawcett ed. 1971). Two recent cases
which quote this passage in support of a right to choose to die are Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986) and In re Caulk, 125
N.H. 226, 236, 480 A.2d 93, 100 (1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In a recent article by Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History: Liberal Theory
and Human Experience, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1013 (1986), the author suggests the liberalism of
John Stuart Mill is animated by political skepticism, and the work of more recent liberal
theorists such as Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls as based on moral skepticism. Id. at
1023. I do not believe that this dichotomy has animated the use of Mill in recent cases.
Instead, Mill provides a liberal paradigm which courts use to justify a moral and political
skepticism.
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. l'thus disagree with the conservative "spin" placed on these cases by Professor
Thomas Grey. See Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 83 (Summer 1980). The author concluded as follows:
To summarize, the Court has consistently protected traditional familial
institutions, bonds and authority against the centrifugal forces of an anomic
modern society. Where less traditional values have been directly protected,
conspicuously in the cases involving contraception and abortion, the decisions
reflect not any Millian glorification of diverse individuality, but the stability-
centered concerns of moderate conservative family and population policy.
The alternative is to see the Court as engaged in the covert promotion of Mill's
principle. The failure to carry the principle through, then, must represent a
prudential guess that to place the protection of the Constitution behind what most
people still reject as unnatural sexual practices would too much strain the Court's
limited stock of public good will. Such a theory might indeed explain Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney. Perhaps the Court has been surprised by the depth and
persistence of the opposition to the abortion decisions, and the swing justices were
1988]
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law areas, however, this model is being replaced by a more communitarian
model. 1
The use of Millian thought in constitutional law is an attempt to
alleviate the tension 2 between claims of right by an individual and claims
of community interest by the state. This article will demonstrate that such
an attempt (1) is in conflict with legal thought outside of constitutional law,
and (2) cannot succeed in structuring a solution to a debate about a right to
commit suicide, but can only result in exacerbating the tensions found in
American liberalism.
The Millian paradigm cannot structure a "solution" for several
reasons. First, this model treats the individual as an impersonal "rights-
holder," whose existence transcends an historical community. It views the
community as both unnecessary and unimportant.' 3 A human being is
replaced by an impersonal legal fiction.' 4 The Millian archetype is
not ready to risk a foray into the explosive issue of gay rights. But if Mill's principle
is in the wings, why have no hints of it appeared in opinions? At least why has the
Court not taken some first step, perhaps striking down one of the absurd "crime
against nature" statutes on vagueness grounds - a decision that would invite little
public wrath outside the lunatic fringe?
Id. at 90 (citation omitted). One reason might be that this principle can more readily be
effectuated by state courts, which decide thousands more cases each year than the Supreme
Court of the United States. Another reason may be that the Justices themselves are divided
over the value of the Millian principle.
I1. See infra notes 27-195.
12. It has been suggested by several authors that liberalism, at least as developed in
the United States, both creates and requires a tension between the individual and the
community. See Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community -American Style,
79 Nw. U.L. REV. 900,901 n.5 (1984-85); Presser, Some Realism About Orphism or The
Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New Great Chain of Being: An English Legal
Academic's Guide to the Current State of American Law, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 869, 875-76
n.33 (1984-85). Professor Duncan Kennedy calls this tension an irresolvable fundamental
contradiction. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205, 211 (1979).
13. See Morawetz, supra note 7; Fowler, God and Mammon and Democratic
Capitalism, 62 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1984).
14. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976), in which the author
argues that law and lawyers use legal masks to disguise the human beings who become
enmeshed in legal disputes. See also J. NOONAN, THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE
RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS (1977); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975); McFeely, Were These People Property? New York Times, Jan. 18, 1987 (Book
Review) at 9-10 (review of H. JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD (1987)) for works
discussing the treatment of enslaved persons without regard to their humanness.
One example of treating persons as legal personalities in discussing the "jurisprudence
of life and death" is found in G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
It is not entirely clear whether we should use the term "person," "human being," or
"live" person to state what it is to be one of us. The word "alive" is not apt, for the
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premised on a vision that we, as individuals, are who we are in spite of
others, not because of others.
Second, rights discourse is indeterminate. 5 It is indeterminate
because one can always appeal to a broader or narrower level of generality
in order to secure or refuse to protect any particular right.16 While all rights
need not be deconstructed so as to better protect the powerless and create a
better community, discourse only in terms of rights is destructive of the
community and the powerless. It leads to an atomistic, emotivist individu-
alism, and limits any broader vision of human beings.
Third, the community is viewed not as a social entity which declares
substantive goals and ideals, and acts to further those goals and ideals, but
as a legal, ahistorical and instrumental entity which may wield power only
as a neutral (as between two rights-asserting individuals) rules-enforcer.
This view denies the community the chance to state a moral vision, and in
the particular case of suicide, an opportunity to foster an ideal of hope and
reconciliation for both the community and all of its members. This ideal is
expressed both necessarily and limited through the unwieldy source of
law.17 Indeed, it may require the community to facilitate individual choices
otherwise disapproved of or condemned.' 8
fetus is unquestionably alive from the moment of conception. What is at stake is not
life, but the acquisition of a legal personality."
Id. at 373.
15. "Rights talk" has been attacked as reifying real experience, see Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1984), and as indeterminate, see Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984) and defended as a discourse which enables a
community to continually construct itself, see Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for
Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1876 (1987) and as a commitment by a community, see
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 424 (1987).
16. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Justice White's opinion is
based on reading the "right" as a specific right to commit sodomy. Justice Blackmun's
dissent is based on reading the "right" as an abstract right to be let alone.
17. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double-Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 280-84 (1973). See also Marcin, Justice
and Love, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 (1984). This can also be seen in a review of the common-
law limitations of a duty to rescue. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201-02
(7th Cir. 1983) (failure of police officer to determine whether any persons were in a burning
car or to call ambulance did not state a claim for relief under section I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, in part because police officer under no common law duty to rescue). Cf
Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 15 (1985); Note, The
Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment - Bystander Duty to
Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1987) (arguing in favor of imposing civil
liability for failure of bystander to report threat of suicide).
18. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175 (1982), believes
this should be considered a shift from liberty to autonomy:
The turn from liberty to autonomy reflects a shift from higher law views that
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:79
Fourth, a vision of an individual autonomous from a community has
already been rejected by courts and legislatures outside of constitutional
law when the issue is suicide.19 This vision was rejected because it could not
comport with a view that human beings have a history and are part of a
cultural community. Another vision of the individual and the community,
one in which the self and the community are created and changed by each
other in an attempt to reconcile one with the other, exists in nonconstitu-
tional legal responses to suicide. Courts and commentators alike have
ignored this latter view in discussing a constitutionalized right to commit
suicide.20 These two visions are incompatible.2 1
No case has explicitly adopted a constitutionally protected right to
commit suicide.2 1 In fact, one of the asserted state interests in so-called
"right to die" cases2 '3 is the prevention of suicide.24
justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific substantive goal,
securing certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state
because it allows for the pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends
that are legitimate. Whereas the liberty of the early liberals was understood to be
confined to activities guided by human reason, modern theorists question the
existence of any self-evident, rational limits on personal choice. Autonomy,
therefore, often connotes significantly broader notions of what conduct must be not
only permitted but protected.
Id. at 177. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy). See also A. MACINTYRE, supra note 5:
The specifically modern self, the self that I have called emotivist, finds no limits set
to that on which it may pass judgment for such limits could only derive from
rational criteria for evaluation and, as we have seen, the emotivist self lacks any
such criteria. Everything may be criticized from whatever standpoint the self has
adopted, including the self's choice of standpoint to adopt.
Id. at 31. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229. In my view,
acceptance of the Mill paradigm requires the community to facilitate requests to commit
suicide.
19. See infra notes 27-195.
20. See, e.g., supra notes 7 & 10.
21. It is difficult to understand why articles and cases concerning a right to privacy, or
a right to die or commit suicide have not contrasted developments in torts, criminal law,
evidence and other areas with constitutional developments.
22. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982), is a case in which Prevatte,
a prisoner who had no dependents and had once been sentenced to die, was permitted to
refuse medical treatment even though he was starving himself to death. Id. at 833-34, 286
S.E.2d at 716. The state's request to feed Prevatte intravenously was denied. Id. at 834, 286
S.E.2d at 717. See also Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1987, at 9, col. 5 (reporting death of a
quadriplegic man who starved to death in hospital after Colorado court ordered hospital to
remove feeding tubes). A similar case is Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986), in which the California Court of Appeal issued an order
requiring the hospital to stop feeding Elizabeth Bouvia and refused to issue a stay of its
order.
23. See infra notes 196-232 and accompanying text.
24. The state interest in preventing suicide was first explicated in Superintendent of
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It is clear, however, that courts have not concluded that there is no
constitutional right to commit suicide. Instead, courts are simply defining
suicide in an increasingly narrow sense,25 and are narrowing the level of
generality "right to die" cases to encompass a specific right to commit
suicide. There is also an attempt to use the Mill paradigm without
acknowledging it or recognizing its consequences. Commentators have
taken the Mill paradigm to advance a right to commit suicide.26 Accept-
ance of this model can lead to no other result.
The next section concerns nonconstitutional legal responses to suicide
in American history. These responses recognized and rejected the Mill
paradigm in favor of an ideal of reconciliation and hope.
II. LEGAL RESPONSE TO SUICIDE
A. Criminal Law
Historically, the first and only considered response to suicide was to
criminalize the act." This response appeared in the English case of Hales
v. Petit,28 a case in which Lady Margaret Hales, widow of Sir James Hales,
who had drowned himself, sued Cyriack Petit on a writ of trespass to lands
leased jointly to her and Sir James for a term of years. 9 In dismissing the
writ, the court held that Sir James' suicide was murder 0 and that the term
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-43, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-26
(1977). It has been adopted by nearly all courts faced with right to die cases. See, e.g., In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17.
26. Richards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A
MoralAnalysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (1981) (asserting as primary any rational,
individual choice as against any community interest); see also Engelhardt & Malloy,
Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003 (1982).
See generally D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); D. RICHARDS,
SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINAL-
IZATION (1982).
27. Compare Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24
DUQ. L. REV. 1,63-108 (1985) with Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status ofSuicide in Early
America: A Comparison with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57 (1982) for a
more intensive study of the history of the criminalization of suicide in early America. For a
tracing of the legal response to suicide from Roman law to English common law to
American law, see Mikell, Is Suicide Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1903), and G.
WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 7 (1957). See also
Comment, Criminal Aspects ofSuicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156 (1975).
28. 1 Plowden 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1562).
29. Id. at 257-58, 75 Eng. Rep. at 394.
30. Id. at 261, 75 Eng. Rep. at 399-400.
19881
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of years was forfeited to the King.8 Utilizing Aquinas, the court found
suicide unlawful because
it is an offence against nature, against God, and against the King. Against
nature, because it is contrary to the rules of self-preservation, which is the
principle of nature, for every thing living does by instinct of nature defend
itself from destruction, and then to destroy one's self is contrary to nature,
and a thing most horrible. Against God, in that it is a breach of His
commandment, thou shalt not kill; and to kill himself, by which act he kills
in presumption his own soul, is a greater offence than to kill another.
Against the King in that hereby he has lost a subject, and [as Brown termed
it] he being the head has lost one of his mystical members. Also he has
offended the King, in giving such an example to his subjects, and it belongs
to the King, who has the government of the people, to take care that no evil
example be given them, and an evil example is an offence against him.32
The court condemned the act, but even at this point in history, it did
not wholly condemn the actor. His soul was presumed lost, but not
concluded lost. The court rendered its decision to deter others from
committing suicide.
Blackstone, whose Commentaries3 were the influential source for
American lawyers and judges in defining the common law from the late
eighteenth century,3" used Hales as an example of the punishments
available against one who committed suicide. Blackstone agreed with the
conclusion that suicide was a form of self-murder.33
At least two colonies passed laws criminalizing suicide, and imposed
punishments against the person (and family) who committed suicide. In
May 1647, the General Court for the Colony and Province of Rhode Island
passed the following law:
Self-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this
present Assembly declared to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself
out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: his death
being presented and thus found upon record by the coronet, his goods and
chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be
an infant, a lunatic, mad or disturbed man, he forfeits nothing.36
31. Id. at 263, 75 Eng. Rep. at 403-04.
32. Id. at 261, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400 (emphasis in original).
33. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 189-90 (1st
American ed. 1771).
34. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 5 & n.4 (1977); L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 112 (1985); G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 35 (1970).
35. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 189.
36. Acts and Orders of the First General Assembly for the Colony and Province of
[Vol. 20:79
SUICIDAL RIGHTS
In October 1660, the General Court for the Massachusetts Bay
Colony enacted a law punishing3 7 one who had committed suicide:
This Court considering how far Satan doth prevail upon several
persons within this Jurisdiction, to make away themselves, judgeth that
God calls them to bear testimony against such wicked and unnatural
practices, that others may be deterred therefrom;
Do therefore, Order, that from henceforth, if any person, Inhabitant
or Stranger, shall at any time be found by any Jury to lay violent hands on
themselves, or be willfully guilty of their own Death, every such person
shall be denied the priviledge [sic] of being Buried in the Common Burying
place of Christians, but shall be Buried in some Common High-way where
the Select-men of the Town where such person did inhabit shall appoint,
and a Cart-load of Stones laid upon the Grave as a Brand of Infamy and as a
warning to others to beware of the like Damnable practices. 8
Some records also indicate that Virginia utilized punishments of
forfeiture and ignominious burial from the mid-seventeenth century until
some time early in the eighteenth century. 9
These laws imposed a severe punishment for suicide. It was already
understood, however, that these laws permitted an excuse. In vainly
attempting to use law to protect the members of the community from the
act and consequences of suicide, the laws never failed to note the possibility
of reconciliation of the person and the community, if the person could be
said not to have known what he was doing when he committed suicide.
Providence (1647), reprinted in THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 19 (J. Cushing ed. 1977).
37. Forfeiture was never an authorized punishment for an act of suicide.
It is also Ordered, and by this Court Declared, that all our Lands and
Heritages shall be free from Fines and Licenses, upon Alienations, and from all
Hariots, Wardships, Liveries, Primerseizins, year, day and waste, Escheats and
forfeitures upon the Death of Parents or Ancestors, natural, unnatural, casual or
judicial and that forever.
The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (E. Rawson ed. 1672),
reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 88 (W. Whitmore ed. 1887).
38. Id. at 137. See also 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND PART I 432 (N. Shurtleff ed. 1854). This law
apparently fell into disuse in the early decades of the 18th century. An instance of the
implementation of the Act in 1707, with burial near rather under a highway, is found in
Noble, A Glance at Suicide as Dealt With in the Colony and in the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay, 16 PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc'Y 521, 521-23 (2d ser. 1902). In 1723 or
1724, John Valentine hanged himself. The coroner's jury found he was non compos mentis,
and so he was not denied a Christian burial. His death led ministers to preach Increase
Mather's sermon against suicide, and the Reverend Mr. Myles refused to read the office of
burial and two bearers declined to serve at the funeral. Davis, Valentine - Vans Currency
Pamphlets, 43 PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc'Y 428, 440-41 (3d ser. 1910).
39. A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 198-99 nn. 15-16 (1930).
19881
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In 1701 the colony of Pennsylvania abolished forfeiture as a punish-
ment for suicide."' Blackstone notwithstanding, most colonies (and later,
states) followed Pennsylvania and abolished forfeiture and all other
punishments for suicide by the end of the eighteenth century.4 The
movement in America to abolish English common law punishments for
suicide has been argued as evidence that persons had a right or liberty to
commit suicide.42 A review of later criminal law cases indicates that this is
not correct.
The three most important criminal law cases concerning suicide in the
nineteenth century were decided in Massachusetts. In Commonwealth v.
Bowen,"' Chief Justice Parker instructed a jury that the defendant's
counseling another prisoner named Jewett to hang himself before being
hanged by the Commonwealth subjected him to a charge of murder as
principal, "considering the similarity between the nature of suicide and the
murder of another. .. .
In Commonwealth v. Dennis," the court held that attempted suicide
was not an indictable offense in Massachusetts." Its reasoning is
instructive:
The end of punishment is the prevention of crime, and it may have
been thought of at least impolitic to punish an attempt to do that which is
itself dispunishable, when the direct effect of the penalty must be to
increase the secrecy and efficiency of the means employed to accomplish
the end proposed.47
The third Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Mink,4 concerned
40. The Charter of Privileges to the Province and Counties [of Pennsylvania] Section
8 (1701), reprinted in THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA1 681-1713 209 (J.
Cushing ed. 1978).
41. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27, at 67-68 & nn.454-60. See
also supra note 37.
42. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 27, at 84.
43. 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
44. Id. at 359. Bowen was apparently followed in Massachusetts even after the repeal
of the Act of 1660 and the Legislature's omission of making a felony an attempted suicide.
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 429 (1877) (citing the unreported case of
Commonwealth v. Pratt (Pa. 1862)).
45. 105 Mass. 162 (1870).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 162-63. Accord May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 A. 885 (1906).
48. 123 Mass. 422 (1877). Cf Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E.
961 (1892) (evidence that alleged victim intended to commit suicide held admissible in
homicide action). A contrary result was reached in Greenacre v. Filby, 276 III. 294, 114




the legality of a verdict of criminal homicide against Lucy Mink.49 In
attempting to kill herself, she had shot and killed her lover, who was
attempting to prevent her suicide.60 The court stated:
Since it has been provided by statute that "any crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in the state prison is a felony, and no other crime
shall be so considered," it may well be that suicide is not technically a
felony in this Commonwealth. But being unlawful and criminal as malum
in se, any attempt to commit it is likewise unlawful and criminal. Everyone
has the same right and duty to interpose to save a life from being so
unlawfully and criminally taken, that he would have to defeat an attempt to
unlawfully to take the life of a third person. 1
The court was attempting to express an ideal of persons responsible for
one another. Through the negative sanction of the criminal law, the court
was searching for a justification of an ideal of a community. There is hope
for the community only as long as there is hope for all members of the
community. 2
The criminal law cases following the set of Massachusetts cases are
consonant with the tenor of those decisions. Two early twentieth century
Texas cases, Grace v. State 3 and Sanders v. State, 4 have been interpreted
as promoting the Millian model in criminal jurisprudence. 55 This interpre-
tation misapprehends the reasoning of the Texas courts in those cases.
Instead of promoting the Millian paradigm, there was a conscious
49. Mink, 123 Mass. at 422.
50. Id. at 422-23.
51. Id. at 429 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
52. See also Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872), in which the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld the murder conviction of one who provided poison to another who used it to
commit suicide. Its rationale:
True, the atrocity of the crime, in a moral sense, would be greatly diminished
by the fact that suicide was intended; yet the law, as we understand it, makes no
discrimination on that account. The lives of all are equally under the protection of
the law, and under that protection to their last moment. The life of those to whom
life has become a burden - of those who are hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded
- nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, are under the protection of
the law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full tide of life's enjoyment, and
anxious to continue to live.
Id. at 163. Cf State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 174,510 N.E.2d 343 (1987) (reversing, in effect,
Blackburn); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1890) (accidentally killing another
while attempting to commit suicide is murder).
53. 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
54. 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908), overruled by Aven v. State, 102 Tex.
Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
.55. Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 26, at 1021-24 (arguing that the Texas cases of
Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902) and Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim.
101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908) evinced an explicit state policy legitimizing assisting suicide).
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effort in legal thought to treat persons who had threatened or attempted
suicide as both needing and requesting help from others. This call for help
required use of the civil commitment laws rather than the criminal law.
However, the criminal law has been used to the present to discourage and
punish others from aiding a suicide. There was simply a recognition that
assistance to persons threatening to commit suicide was better effectuated
outside of the criminal law.
In Grace v. State,56 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a
conviction for murder. The defendant, Dr. Grace, a married man, was
engaged in an affair with Mollie Lane. In order to protect himself from
Lane's family, he carried a loaded pistol, which he placed on a dresser.5"
While the Graces and Mollie Lane discussed the problems between Lane's
family and Dr. Grace, Lane grabbed the pistol from the dresser and shot
and killed herself. 58 It is clear from the language of the opinion that the
court believed the jury was punishing Grace for having an affair with
Mollie Lane, rather than for murder.59 Instead of reversing on grounds
which might be viewed as interfering with the fact-finding function of the
jury, 0 it declared, "[s] o far as the law is concerned, the suicide is innocent;
therefore the party who furnishes the means to the suicide must also be
innocent of violating the law."61 This declaration was simply legitimating
through law that which could not be done in fact. The court used its power
to review questions of law to amend a jury's decision concerning a question
of fact. The decision was not a statement about the case before it.6" The
court did not implicitly or explicitly affirm or pronounce a state policy
legitimating suicide or assisting suicide.63 At most, it simply refused to
condemn Mollie Lane.
56. 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529.
57. Id. at 196, 69 S.W. at 530-31.
58. Id. at 196, 69 S.W. at 532.
59. Id. at 195, 69 S.W. at 530 ("Again, we do not believe the facts justify the charge. It
was an assumption of facts not shown by the record."); id. at 196, 69 S.W. at 531 ("As we
understand the record, there is no evidence showing, or tending to show, that appellant
placed the pistol on the dresser for the purpose or with the intent that deceased should use it
in inflicting the fatal wound.").
60. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27, at 83 n.559 (suggesting that
the court may have believed it had no authority to review questions of fact).
61. Grace, 44 Tex. Crim. at 195, 69 S.W. at 530.
62. A remarkably similar case was decided the next year in Illinois. In Burnett v.
People, 204 I11. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed Burnett's
murder conviction on the explicit ground that the evidence did not show he had induced his
lover, Mrs. Nichol, to commit suicide. The court bolstered its decision by stating "we have
never regarded the English law as to suicide as applicable to the spirit of our institutions."
Id. at 222, 68 N.E. at 510. There is no citation in Burnett to Grace.
63. Grace, 44 Tex. Crim. at 195, 69 S.W. at 530 ("On the day of the fearful
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Six years later, in Sanders v. State," the same court reversed another
murder conviction, again using a legal construction to avoid reversing
based on insufficient evidence.65 This construction criminalized only those
actions taken by the defendant which it deemed active rather than
passive.66 However, the evidence introduced at trial did not indicate that
Sanders had passively or "indirectly" assisted the victim's suicide. His
defense was a complete defense; he had not given the deceased the vials of
poison and had neither encouraged nor induced her to take the poison . 7
In another case, Aven v. State,6" the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
was actually faced with evidence that the defendant had administered
arsenic to his wife and his murder conviction was upheld. 69 The court
considered the fact that the victim requested her husband to administer the
poison to her inconsequential."0 Further, the fact that she had swallowed
the poison, arguably indicative of her volition, did not mean Aven's actions
were passive.
The active/passive distinction is not meaningful in legal thought."
This judicially-constructed boundary has usually collapsed once there is
reason to believe that the defendant assisted the commission of the suicide
in any way. This distinction is simply a legal fiction designed in an attempt
to limit the reverberating consequences of a suicide.7 2
There is no other criminal case which purports to legitimize suicide or
tragedy. ); id. at 196,69 S.W. at 531 ("this unfortunate tragedy. ). Had the court
intended to legitimate acts of suicide or assisting suicide, there was some authority to use as
support. See Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs, 66 N.J.L.
274, 283, 49 A. 550, 553 (1901) ("As to the abstract immorality of suicide, opinions may
differ, but all will admit that in some cases is it ethically defensible."); see also 58 ALBANY
L.J. 102-03 (1898) (reporting on an article, The Right to Commit Suicide, MEDICO-LEGAL
J. (Aug. 1898) in which the author argues in support of this right from the Mill paradigm).
64. 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908).
65. The court remanded the case, advising:
Upon another trial we would suggest, as we understand the case, the theories
pro and con, much of which is pure speculation and theory, that there are and can be
but two issues, if the case should develop again as it did upon this trial, calling for a
disposition at the hands of the jury.
Id. at 109, 112 S.W. at 79 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 103-05, 112 S.W. at 69-70.
67. Id. at 105-06, 112 S.W. at 70-71.
68. 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 483, 277 S.W. at 1083.
71. See supra note 55.
72. In writing about euthanasia, Richard Sherlock has forcefully exposed the false,
formalistic distinctions made between concepts like active and passive, voluntary and
involuntary. Sherlock, For Everything There is a Season: The Right to Die in the United
States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 548-61 (1982).
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assisting suicide. While a few cases have concluded differently on the issue
of whether attempted suicide is a crime, 3 no court has determined that the
act was conduct condoned or permitted as a matter of public policy.
Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, there was recognition
that the criminal law was an inadequate means to express a public policy
concerning suicide:
Calling suicide self-murder is a curt way of justifying an indictment
and trial of an unfortunate person who has not the fortitude to bear any
more of the ills of this life. His act may be a sin, but it is not a crime; it is the
result of disease. He should be taken to a hospital and not sent to a prison. 74
This was the position taken shortly thereafter by a Harvard Law School
professor: "One who attempts suicide should be classed not as a criminal,
but as an unfortunate person amenable to temporary deprivation of liberty.
He should be made subject to restraint in the discretion of a magistrate not
exceeding a brief, definite period."7 5
This view has succeeded in replacing the view that attempts at suicide
should be criminalized. Most states permit civil commitment of persons
who threaten to harm themselves, or who have harmed themselves. Some
states explicitly note suicidal behavior as justification for civil commit-
ment.76 Use of the criminal law to discourage assisting suicide is still a part
73. Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953) (attempted suicide is not
criminal, but is unlawful); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933) (dictum
that attempted suicide not a crime); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903)
(attempted suicide a misdemeanor under New Jersey law); State v. LaFayette, 15 N.J.
Misc. 115, 188 A. 918 (C.P. Camden County Ct. 1937); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121
S.E.2d 854 (1961) (attempted suicide is an indictable misdemeanor); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 26 Pa. C. 666, 11 Pa. D. 144 (Quarter Sess., Philadelphia County Ct. 1902)
(holding attempted suicide is not a crime). There are no reported cases since 1961
concerning whether attempted suicide is criminal or unlawful. Accord Note, Criminal
Liabilityfor Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 n.22 (1986). It appears that
attempted suicide is not a crime in any state.
74. Wright, 26 Pa. C. at 669, 11 Pa. D. at 146.
75. Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARV. L. REV. 331, 340-41 (1904).
76. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27, at Appendix (listing states
whose civil commitment statutes permit civil confinement of one who intends to or does
physical harm to oneself); Note, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14
VILL. L. REV. 463, 483 (1969) ("The basic proposition in this Comment is that suicide is a
medical rather than a legal problem."); see also Schulman, Suicide and Suicide
Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54 A.B.A. J. 855 (1968). Questioning the validity of this view
is Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 227 (1974). See Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil
Commitment - Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929,940-42
(1987) (reporting failure of civil commitment laws to prevent suicide); Hohler, N.H.
Suicide Renews Concern About Law, Boston Globe, July 24, 1987, at 57, cols. 1-3 (police
had failed in attempt to involuntarily commit woman who, one day later, killed herself).
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of an indirect enforcement of a policy to prevent suicides. 77 A more positive
public vision concerning suicide is gleaned mainly in other areas of law. 8
There is no evidence in the criminal law that the individual is
recognized as having a private, autonomous sphere in which he can make a
decision free from community constraints or ideals. These criminal cases
indicate a halting, but continuous, attempt to enforce a moral vision held
by the community. The criminal law is understood to be limited in scope,
but available to condemn acts of assisting suicide,7 9 and available to
encourage one to prevent another from committing suicide.80 These legal
responses are awkward statements which, while condemning suicide, offer
the possibility of hope and reconciliation and insist that the acts of one who
attempts or commits suicide affect and concern the entire community.
77. Recent cases discussing the criminality of assisting suicide include In re Joseph G.,
34 Cal. 3d 429,667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983); People v. Campbell, 124 Mich.
App. 33, 335 N.W.2d 27 (1983), appeal denied, 418 Mich. 905, 342 N.W.2d 519 (1984);
State v. Mays, 307 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1983); State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 278 N.W.2d
756, modified, 204 Neb. 196, 281 N.W.2d 749 (1979); State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 174,
510 N.E.2d 343 (1987).
78. 1 believe that the vision that a suicide is not simply an act solely of an individual is
firmly grounded in criminal law. Laws forbidding assistance of suicide form some support
for that proposition. See Note, supra note 73, at 350-54 & nn.22-42 (citing state laws
criminalizing assisting suicide); see also Marzan, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27,
at Appendix (also noting laws criminalizing suicide assistance). See MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (1985 ed.) (Causing or Aiding Suicide). Further,
several states have enacted statutes making certain acts (like assault), which are otherwise
criminal, privileged if the actor is attempting to prevent a person from committing suicide.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(4) (McKinney 1987): "A person acting under a
reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical
injury upon himself, may use physical force upon such person to the extent that he
reasonably believes it necessary to thwart such result." See also MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (1985 ed.) (authorizing the use of force to prevent a
suicide).
In Florida, a woman was convicted of child abuse for causing the suicide of her 17 year-
old daughter. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Newsweek, Nov. 9, 1987, at 86,
col. 4. This is indicative of an attempt, through the criminal law, to effectuate an ideal of
reconciling the community and the self. I am well aware that imposing these ideals through
the framework of the criminal law may defeat its purpose, for it is a single person, a mother
about whom we know little, and not the community, who is punished for causing her
daughter's suicide.
79. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816); Commonwealth v. Pratt (Pa.
1862), unreported case cited in Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 429 (1877). See
Marzan, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27, at 75-78 (listing statutes criminalizing
assisting suicide).
80. Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877). See supra note 76.
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B. Insurance
1. Life and Accident Insurance
A study of life insurance cases in which the insured committed suicide
provides another view of the community's ideal of hope or reconciliation
expressed in law.8 1 Beginning in the 1870s, the United States Supreme
Court decided a number of cases concerning the legal construction of a life
insurance policy containing an exclusion if the insured "shall die by his own
hand,' 82 or as a result of "suicide, sane or insane."' 3
In Life Insurance Co. v. Terry,84 the Supreme Court was faced with
two lines of opinions construing the former exclusion quite differently.
Justice Hunt structured the issue in the following manner:
The request for instructions made by the counsel of the insurance
company, proceeds on the theory that if the deceased had sufficient mental
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his act, that is, that
he was about to take poison, and that his death would be the result, he was
responsible for his conduct, and the defendant is not liable; and the fact that
his sense of moral responsibility was impaired by insanity, does not affect
the case.8"
This theory, which denied recovery to the beneficiary of the contract
even if the insured was insane when he died, was based on the English case
of Borradaile v. Hunter.86 Borradaile had been adopted in at least four
81. An interesting criminological study of what I call an ideal of hope or reconciliation
is found in Hoffman & Webb, Suicide as Murder at Common Law, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 372
(1981). The authors studied the administration of suicide laws by coroners' juries in
England in the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries. During that time, a person
found to have committed suicide would forfeit his chattels and be denied a Christian burial.
Id. at 377-78. A finding of insanity absolved the person and his family of these criminal
punishments.
Suicide because of "temporary insanity" was the verdict most commonly
returned by coroners' juries. The type of verdict appears to have fluctuated
somewhat over time, with the proportion of suicide cases where a verdict of insanity
[as opposed to felo-de-se] was returned increasing from the mid-fourteenth century
to the nineteenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century, a suicide was rarely
pronounced sane. The coroners of the county of Kent, for example, turned in a
verdict of felo-de-se in only 15 out of 580 suicide cases between 1770 and 1788.
Id. at 379 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). See also C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 158-
63 (Signet Classic ed. 1964) (describing a coroner's inquest in nineteenth century England
in much the same way).
82. Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 580 (1872).
83. Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins., Inc., 93 U.S. 284 (1876).
84. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 580.
85. Id. at 581.
86. 5 Manning & Granger 639 (1843).
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American courts, according to Justice Hunt."7 The latter theory, which
excluded from the category of "suicide" all self-inflicted deaths occurring
while the insured was insane, had been stated first in the New York case of
Breasted v. The Farmers' Loan & Trust Company.88 This theory of
construction had been adopted by two courts and a treatise writer.89
The Court acknowledged that "[t]here is a conflict in the authorities
which cannot be reconciled." 90 The Court affirmed the circuit court's9'
instructions to the jury, and thus also affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of
the beneficiary, Mrs. Terry. In doing so, it adopted a Breasted-like
approach.
This approach is important for several reasons: First, it is an attempt
to use a subjective test, that is, it tests whether the insured understood the
moral nature of his act, or understood right from wrong. Second, in
utilizing a subjective test, the Court was choosing to use a test embraced as
a matter of public policy, rather than permitting "private" parties to define
the exclusionary clause in a different and more limited fashion with court
approval.92 Third, this construction permitted cases to go to juries for a
decision in accordance with their beliefs and ideals.
In 1876, the Supreme Court severely limited the scope of the Terry
decision in Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company.93 The insurer
had inserted a clause excluding itself from liability when the insured's
death was a result of "suicide, sane or insane." '94 The Court did not
construe the exclusion in accordance with the public understanding of
suicide. The exclusionary phrase would be self-contradictory. Instead, it
interpreted it more formally and narrowly as an expression "understood"
87. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 586. Justice Hunt listed Hartman v. Keystone Ins.
Co., 21 Pa. 466 (1853); Dean v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 86 Mass. 96 (4 Allen) (1862); St.
Louis Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, 69 Ky. 268 (6 Bush) (1869); and Nimick v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 10 A.L. Reg. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1871).
88. 4 Hill 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), affd, 8 N.Y. 299 (1853).
89. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.), at 587-88 (quoting PHILLIPS ON INSURANCE § 894).
The other cases were Eastabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224 (1866) and Gay v.
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9 Blatchford C.C. 142 (2d Cir. 1871).
90. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 588.
91. The circuit court panel had consisted of Justice Dillon of the Eighth Circuit and
Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Miller, who had charged the jury. Terry v.
Insurance Co., I Dillon 403, 404-05 (8th Cir. 1871).
92. The contractualization of American law in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries is depicted and analyzed in G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). See
generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275-79 (1985); M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 160-210 (1977).
93. Bigelow, 93 U.S. at 284.
94. Id. at 286.
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by the parties.9 5 This permitted the Court to affirm the validity of the
insurer's demurrer to plaintiff's replication that the insured "was of
unsound mind, and wholly unconscious of the act,"96 even though this was
the same replication approved in Breasted.97
The Terry theory or construction was revived a year later in Insurance
Company v. Rodel.99 Plaintiff, the widow of Emil Rodel, who killed himself
by swallowing poison, introduced evidence that Rodel was insane at the
time of his death. The insurance policy under examination in Rodel, as in
Terry, contained an exclusion where the insured died "by his own hand." 99
The jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding:
It is hardly necessary to say, that, if there was any evidence tending to
prove that the deceased was insane when he took the poison which caused
his death, the judge was not bound to, and indeed could not properly, take
the evidence from the jury. The weight of the evidence is for them, and not
for the judge, to pass upon. 00
The Court also reaffirmed the jury instructions approved in Terry.'
Bigelow was not cited by the Court. Terry became the rule, and Bigelow
the exception.
Subsequent to Terry and Rodel, the Court began to develop its
jurisprudence on the issue of insurance and suicide. In doing so, the Court
permitted a plaintiff to sue and recover the policy amount in federal court
after being nonsuited in state court;"0 2 it permitted a case to go to a jury
based on the opinion of a nonprofessional witness that the decedent was
insane; 03 found that a policy of accident insurance applied to a case of
suicide while insane;' 0 ' held that the law presumes that an act is not suicide
unless overcome by competent evidence;105 concluded that plaintiff's proof
95. Id. at 286-87. This was an "objectified" construction. The Court was not looking at
the parties' actual intent, but rather at an intent two "reasonable" parties would have meant
in agreeing to this clause.
96. Id. at 288.
97. Id.
98. 95 U.S. 232 (1877).
99. Id. at 233.
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 241.
102. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.S. 121 (1883).
103. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612 (1884).
104. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U.S. 527 (1877).
105. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (1888). In McConkey, the Court
did reverse a judgment for the plaintiff because the instructions implied that if the
decedent's death was a result of murder, the plaintiff should recover. The Court limited
recovery to cases of accidental death.
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of the decedent's insanity can be made at trial, without stating it in a
preliminary proof of death form;106 upheld as constitutional a statute
prohibiting insurance companies from using a defense of suicide;10 7
partially reversed Bigelow in holding that a private agreement by the
parties to limit recovery in cases of suicide could be constitutionally
abrogated as a matter of state policy; 08 and held that policies which do not
contain exclusionary clauses in cases of suicide are not inconsistent with
public policy,' 09 thus reversing the one case" 0 inconsistent with the cases
noted in this paragraph. This line of decisions was generally followed by
state courts."'
It was the unusual Ritter"' case mentioned above which gave rise to a
remarkable opinion by the Supreme Court of New Jersey." 3 The issue in
Ritter was whether life insurance benefits must be paid to the beneficiary
when the insured committed suicide and the policy did not contain a suicide
exclusion clause. In speaking to this issue, Justice Harlan wrote for the
court:
A contract, the tendency of which is to endanger the public interests or
injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound morality,
106. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U.S. 468 (1893).
107. Knights Templars' and Masons' Life Indem. Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197
(1902). The Missouri statute upheld in Jarman, Mo. REv. STATS. § 5982 (1879), was
enacted shortly after the Supreme Court decided Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 232
(1877), a case which arose in Missouri. This 1879 statute is still in effect in Missouri. It is
codified as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.620 (Vernon 1986).
108. Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
109. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96 (1920).
110. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898). Justice Harlan held that
even when the policy contained no exclusion for an act of suicide while sane, an implied
condition of the contract, required by public policy, is that the insured not commit an act of
self-destruction. Ten years later, Justice Harlan repudiated this view and held Missouri's
statute prohibiting the insurer the defense of suicide constitutional in Whitfield v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489, 495 (1907).
111. Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 II1. 549, 68 N.E. 492 (1903); Grand Lodge
Indep. Order of Mut. Aid v. Wieting, 168 II1. 408, 48 N.E. 59 (1897); Blackstone v.
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 592,42 N.W. 156 (1889); Kerr v. Minnesota
Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N.W. 312 (1888); Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75
Neb. 188, 106 N.W. 224 (1905), adhered to, 75 Neb. 196, 110 N.W. 1110 (1907).
See also Darrow v. Family Fund Soc'y, 116 N.Y. 537,22 N.E. 1093 (1889), overruled
by Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398,67 N.E. 83 (1903). Contra Shipman
v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, 67 N.E. 83 (1903) (adopting Ritter rationale).
See also Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order of Heptasophs, 105 Va. 643, 55
S.E. 9 (1906); Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N.W.
980 (1898).
112. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898).
113. Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs, 66 N.J.L. 274,
49 A. 550 (1901).
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ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice or be made the
foundation of itsjudgment. If, therefore, a policy -taken out by the person
whose life is insured, and in which the sum named is made payable to
himself, his executors, administrators or assigns - expressly provided for
the payment of the sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind,
took his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute, would be
held to be against public policy, in that it tempted or encouraged the
assured to commit suicide in order to make provision for those dependent
upon him, or to whom he was indebted. '4
Justice Harlan's language was limited to cases of suicide while sane.
This was simply a restatement of Terry which limited the culpability of the
"insane" person who had committed suicide, that person's family and the
larger community. It seems clear that Justice Harlan attempted to express
an ideal of hope or reconciliation for both the community and persons
contemplating suicide. His error was in using law to deny the existence of
suicide, in attempting to remedy suicides by use of formalist reasoning, and
in attacking something one giant step removed from the issue of suicide, the
life insurance contract. He was not worried about preventing "frauds"
upon the insurance companies. His opinion is similar to opinions which
criminalized attempted suicide. In both cases, there was an attempt to
utilize the power and moral force of law to remedy a problem outside the
control of law.
Justice Collins, speaking for a majority of the highest New Jersey
court in a case decided not long after the Ritter decision, attacked Ritter by
attacking the legal condemnation of suicide: "In New Jersey neither
suicide nor attempt to commit suicide has, since 1796 at least, been
criminal."'1 5 He then bolstered his decision to permit recovery of the policy
amount by appealing to a different view of the ethics of suicide and his
understanding of the nature of American government:
As to the abstract immorality of suicide generally, opinions may
differ; but all will admit that in some cases it is ethically defensible. Else
how could a man "lay down his life for his friend?" Suicide may be self-
sacrifice, as when a woman slays herself to save her honor. Sometimes self-
destruction, humanly speaking, is excusable, as when a man curtails by
weeks or months the agony of an incurable disease ...
114. 169 U.S. at 154.
115. Campbell, 60 N.J.L. at 283, 49 A. at 553. This view was rejected two years later
by a lower court of appeal in State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903) (holding
attempted suicide a misdemeanor in New Jersey and specifically rejecting the Campbell
opinion). It was also criticized in Potts v. Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 48 N.J.
Super. 554, 138 A.2d 574 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958) and Penny v. Municipal Court,
312 F. Supp. 938 (D.N.J. 1970).
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As to the public good requiring the discouragement of suicide, there
may be also two opinions. The paternal theory of government does not here
prevail. The common law condemned suicide, according to Hale and
Blackstone, not only for religious reasons, but for the temporal one that the
king has an interest in the preservation of all his subjects, and doubtless the
same is true of an organized commonwealth and its citizens; but I cannot
see that the public good is more concerned to prolong a life that may be
worthless to the public than to secure to creditors their just demands, or to
afford a maintenance to wife and children. Insurers may guard their
interests in their contracts. I know no public policy more useful than that
which holds contractors to performance."'
The difference may indicate a philosophical split between the two
courts. If this is the case, it is clear that the view of Justice Harlan has
predominated. The divergence between Ritter and Campbell may also,
however, be slight. It is likely that the majority in Campbell simply did not
want to afford insurers another way to avoid liability, especially when the
insurer, which drafted the contract, had failed to protect its interests. Since
its decision appears contrary to federal common law,117 the court may have
thought it wise to appeal to ethical and political thought. In order to avoid
the Ritter decision, it may have believed it necessary to appeal to the
philosophy of utilitarianism.11 8 While this statement is troublesome, it
simply may be a rhetorical flourish, and not an evaluation of the merits of
the insured's death.
2. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
A number of consequences resulted from these court decisions which
permitted a beneficiary of a life insurance contract to collect the policy
amount when an insured committed suicide while insane.
When an insurer raised the defense of suicide exclusion, the courts
held the insurer to have the burden of proving the suicide.1 19 While some
courts held that the insurer's burden was to prove suicide by a preponder-
116. Campbell, 66 N.J.L. at 283-84, 49 A. at 553.
117. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
118. This suggests the present argument concerning the quality of life as against the
sanctity of life. See Destro, Quality-of-life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The
Demise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J.
CONT. HEALTH L. & POL. 71, 86-122 (1986). See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (approving and accepting Bouvia's decision that
her life had no meaning).
119. See 19 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 79:458, at 405-09 & n.18 (Rhodes rev. ed.
1983) (listing cases from most American jurisdictions).
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ance of the evidence, 2 ' other courts went further, requiring proof by clear
and convincing evidence' or proof excluding every reasonable possibility
other than suicide.' 22 In addition, a number of courts have simply stated
that the insurer's proof must be sufficient to satisfy a jury. 12 3
Courts also fashioned a rebuttable presumption that a death was not a
suicide.' 2 4 If conflicting evidence was introduced showing the possibility of
either suicide or accident, the death was presumed an accident. 12 5 This
legal presumption even extended to a self-inflicted death.' This presump-
tion was often given evidentiary value. 7
Additionally, evidence of a verdict of suicide by a coroner is usually
admissible at a suicide exclusion trial, but is not conclusive evidence of
suicide. 28 Opinion testimony by lay witnesses is seemingly limited to
instances which indicate that the deceased was insane at the time of
death.'29
These uses of law are explicitly premised on the belief that it is
unnatural for a person to commit suicide, and that an act of suicide is an act
of moral turpitude. There is an unwillingness to believe that this act could
be intended by a person of free will. In order to avoid condemning the
person who committed suicide, legal constructs are created which place the
person's death outside the category of suicide. A death is presumed
accidental; a jury is permitted to conclude that the person did not know
120. Id. § 79:459, at 409-10 n.8 (listing cases).
121. Id. at 410 n.10 (listing cases).
122. Id. at 411 n. 12 (listing cases). See also Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 388
A.2d 476 (D.C. 1978) (jury verdict for plaintiff affirmed in part because evidence
introduced made possibility of murder more probable than not).
123. Id. at 410-11 n.l 1 (listing cases).
124. Id. § 79:521, at 474. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959)
(error for Eighth Circuit to hold that jury could not conclude death was accidental when
state law applicable to case retained presumption of accidental death after evidence of
suicide admitted).
125. Id. at 474-77 & nn.18-20.
126. Id. at 477 n.1.
127. For an extensive discussion of the varying views concerning the legal treatment of
a presumption against suicide, see Wyckoffv. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Or. 592, 147 P.2d
227 (1944), in which the majority reversed a verdict, over a strong dissent, for the insurer on
the ground that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that
there is a legal presumption against suicide.
128. COUCH, supra note 119, § 79:254, at 198-99; see also id. § 79:556, at 513
("Whether death was by accident or suicide cannot be shown by the declaration of a
physician that the deceased committed suicide, since suicide is the material fact in issue.").
129. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612 (1884); COUCH,
supra note 119, § 79:556, at 513 nn.6-7. Cf. Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d
309,398 N.E.2d 517,422 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1979) (in wrongful death action where defendant
alleges suicide, physician-patient privilege held inapplicable).
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what he or she was doing in a moral sense, and thus can exculpate the
person whose death might otherwise be socially and culturally condemned.
This permits the community to continue to believe in right and wrong, in
good and evil, and to continue to view the individual as a fellow member of
the community. It also permits the community to avoid condemning itself.
C. Civil Liability and Suicide
1. Introduction
The discussions of suicide in criminal law and in insurance law were
intended to show the devices used by a community both to condemn suicide
and to offer the possibility of hope and reconciliation to those who had
committed and attempted suicide. This possibility of reconciliation was
also afforded the community. The ideal was used by the community to
continue to believe in and rely upon a moral vision.
The following section develops the legal response to cases of suicide
when a family member or spouse alleged a civil wrong. My argument is
that the Mill paradigm was developed by courts in civil cases, not
coincidentally during the same time period as the rise of legal formalism.
This model fell apart because it failed to treat the person who committed
suicide as a human being, and because it refused to recognize a community
vision. The Millian archetype alienated the individual from the community
to an intolerable level, which required its rejection in civil cases. Ironically,
the destruction of the Mill paradigm in civil liability cases occurred at
approximately the same time as it arose in the individual constitutional
rights area.1 30
2. History of Civil Liability for Suicide
Charles Scheffer suffered injuries to his head and other parts of his
body during a collision between two trains caused by the negligence of
employees of the train in which Scheffer was riding. His head injury caused
"phantasms, illusions, and foreboding of unendurable evils to come upon
him." 3 Eight months after the accident he killed himself.1 3
For the Court, the decision was easy. "The proximate cause of the
death of Scheffer was his own act of self-destruction." '1 33 A suicide could
not be foreseen as a natural and probable consequence of Scheffer's injury.
130. This transformation occurred in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
131. Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249, 250 (1882).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 252.
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Further, Scheffer's insanity "was as little the natural or probable result of
"1134the negligence of the railway officials as his suicide ... .
Scheffer, an 1882 Supreme Court decision, comported with the
emerging late nineteenth century view of legal causation, which empha-
sized individuality. "The man may have committed suicide; we say he
himself was the cause of his death."1 5 Hence, a person's actions could be
separated from the actions of other persons and the actions of the
community through neatly described legal categories. 136
Eight years after the Scheffer decision, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy.137 The authors took a number of
seemingly unrelated cases and organized them so as to create a new tort
action for invasion of a common right to privacy, a right to be let alone. 138
This vision of separateness was reinforced when the influential New York
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Cardozo, fostered a
common law right of bodily self-determination: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body."139 State courts deciding tort cases in which the plaintiff
argued that the defendant's negligence caused the suicide of another
134. Id.
135. Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201 212 (1870). The irony
is that Green was emphasizing the policy nature of this kind of statement. His view
generally went unheeded in cases. Later, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. took up Green's attack
on the "nature" of causation. See generally 0. HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897).
136. See Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, reprinted in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982):
The idea of vindication of individual rights was intimately connected with the
notion of objective causation. Only if it was possible to say objectively that A caused
B's injury would courts be able to take money from A and give damages to B without
being charged for redistribution. Without objective causation a court might be free
to choose among a variety of possible defendants in order to vindicate the plaintiff's
claim.
Id. at 202.
137. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
138. For Brandeis, this right had evolved from a private right against individuals to a
constitutional right against the government:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Accord
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914). Accord Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (1905).
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adopted this vision. 1 0 Suicide was an efficient, intervening act which was
the cause of death and the negligence of another could not legally cause the
suicide of another.
The courts were certainly not compelled to travel in this direction.
There was ample authority to view causation very differently. A number of
cases decided from about the turn of the century until the 1910s held
providers of intoxicating liquors liable for the suicides of those to whom
liquor was furnished, if the suicide was "caused" by the intoxication."1
These Civil Damage Acts (or dramshop acts) were usually construed to
require some chain of causation between the sale of the intoxicating liquor
and the suicide. This construction emphasizes the choice and policy nature
of "linking" the causes; it does not attempt to ascertain a "natural"
proximate cause.""
These cases had only minimal influence on civil actions for suicide,
most likely because dramshop acts were part of the temperance move-
ment,"' and were not considered part of a change in legal thought.
Two widely followed decisions advocated and adopted an objective,
formal view of causation. In re Sponatski'" involved the suicide of a man
who had been splashed in the eye with molten lead at work." 5 While
hospitalized, he jumped to his death. The injury to Sponatski's eye was
compensable under the worker's compensation act which had recently
been passed in Massachusetts." 6 The court affirmed an award to the
140. Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909);
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); Koch v.
Fox, 71 A.D. 288,75 N.Y.S. 913 (1902), approved in, Koch v. Zimmerman, 85 A.D. 370,
83 N.Y.S. 339 (1903). See also Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913)
(sustaining a demurrer to a complaint alleging an intention of defendant to cause suicide of
plaintiff's husband on grounds that facts alleged were insufficient to show that suicide was a
known and natural result of the acts of the defendant).
141. Hammers v. Knight, 168 Ill. App. 203 (1912); Poffinbarger v. Smith, 27 Neb.
788,43 N.W. 1150 (1889); Lawson v. Eggleston, 28 A.D. 52, 52 N.Y.S. 181 (1898), affid
without opinion, 164 N.Y. 600,59 N.E. 1124 (1900);Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S.D. 11, 101
N.W. 1081 (1904).
142. See, e.g., Lawson v. Eggleston, 28 A.D. 52, 52 N.Y.S. 181 (1898), affd without
opinion, 164 N.Y. 600, 59 N.E. 1124 (1900). See also Greenacre v. Filby, 276 Ill. 294, 114
N.E. 536 (1916) (in wrongful death action against liquor dealers, allegation by dealers of
decedent's intent to commit suicide held irrelevant and judgment in favor of decedent's
widow affirmed).
143. See generally J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); see also M. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR
OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 374-78 (1984) (discussing the religious
roots of the temperance movement).
144. 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).




Sponatski estate on the ground that he committed suicide as a result of an
uncontrollable impulse and used the tort language of proximate cause as a
limitation of future awards.147 This introduction into the new field of
worker's compensation of proximate causation as "objective" causation
had a much greater effect than the decision to affirm the claim.1" 8
In Salsedo v. Palmer,49 the plaintiff accused A. Mitchell Palmer, in
his capacity as Attorney General of the United States, of deliberately
inflicting physical and mental harm on her husband causing him to lose
control of his mind and commit suicide. 5 ' The Second Circuit relied on
Scheffer and treatise writers' 5' in holding that Salsedo's death resulted
from his intervening act of suicide:
We may say in conclusion that we concede that a course of either
mental or physical torture, or of both combined, may cause a death. And we
also concede that the same course or courses of torture may produce a
frame of mind that desires death as a means of relief. It is conceivable,
therefore, that a tortured man may kill himself. But, if he so kills himself
deliberately, we hold that there is an intervening act of his own will for
which the New York [wrongful death] act affords no remedy. If, on the
other hand, it is contended that his self-killing is not his own act, but is the
result of suicidal mania, we hold that suicidal mania is not a natural or
reasonable result of either mental or physical torture. It is a most
reasonable inference, it seems to us, to say that suicidal mania can be
regarded as the natural and probable consequence of either mental or
physical torture. So that, if the man does not kill himself deliberately, but
his death is due to suicidal mania, which results from torture, we hold that
the act of suicide cannot be regarded as the natural and reasonable result of
147. Id. at 530-32, 108 N.E. at 467-68 (adopting the rationale of the tort case of
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903)).
148. Sponatski has only recently come under sustained attack for its use of objective
causation. See Director v. Cooper Assocs., Inc., 607 F.2d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Delaware
Tire Center v. Fox, 411 A.2d 606 (Del. 1980); In re Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373
N.E.2d 1174 (1978); Kahle v. Plochman, Inc., 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981). See also
Batt & Bastien, Suicide as a Compensation Claim Under Workers' Compensation
Statutes: A Guide for the Lawyer and the Psychiatrist, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 369 (1984);
Note, Worker's Compensation - Evolving Standards for Compensability of Suicide, 55
TEMP. L.Q. 194 (1982); 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 36, at 6-54 (1985)
(noting that 41 states statutorily permit the use of the specific defense of suicide, as does the
Longshoremen's and United States Employees' Compensation Acts).
149. 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921).
150. Id. at 93 n.l. It appears that as a result of the Red Scare of 1919, Salsedo, a
citizen of Italy, was imprisoned by Palmer for more than two months, and subjected to
beatings and threats of being killed. While Salsedo was held in confinement, he killed
himself. There is no reference by the Second Circuit to these "extra-legal" circumstances.
151. Id. The Court cited Addison, Pollock and Cooley, as well as English judges Lord
Bacon and Lord Ellenborough concerning proximate cause. Id. at 94-96.
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the torture of misconduct alleged, and that the New York act affords no
remedy.15
The majority opinion was widely accepted.15 A compelling dissent
arguing that the cause of Salsedo's death by suicide was his "loss of mind,"
attributable not to Salsedo but to Palmer was lost. Thus, the dissent
argued, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. 54
The individual was now set apart from the community and other
individuals. Proximate cause neatly limited a person's responsibility for his
or her actions on others, and, of course, left the individual without recourse
to aid from the community. This view of causation also eliminated a
community's ability both to disapprove of certain actions and to offer hope
of reconciliation to a person whose death was by suicide, and, as
importantly, to that person's family and friends. This rationale of proxi-
mate cause was used for about the next forty years.1 5 Although it began to
disintegrate around 1960, the rationale used in Salsedo was the source for
the Tennessee Supreme Court's amazing decision in Lancaster v.
Mon tesi.1 56
Margaret Lancaster had been living with Louis Montesi, and was
alleged to have been dominated and controlled by him, and sadistically
beaten by him.1"7 The night before she killed herself, she had apparently
tried to leave Montesi.1 58 Shortly before she killed herself, she called a
friend, and in Montesi's presence, said she was going to "end it all."1 59
Montesi rejected a plea by this friend that he do something for Lancaster,
and left the apartment.1 60 She then wrote a note saying, "Ma Ma, I'm
152. Id. at 99.
153. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217 (1965).
154. Salsedo, 278 F. at 100 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
155. The relaxed use of cause in the dramshop cases, supra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text, was not utilized in cases arising in the 1930s and 1940s, which alleged
violation of laws regulating sales of drugs. The courts instead relied on a Salsedo-like
objective causation and dismissed suits against druggists charged with causing suicide by
negligently selling a dangerous drug to one who committed suicide. See Riesbeck Drug Co.
v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942); Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212
S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324 (1948); Eckerd's, Inc. v. McGhee, 19 Tenn. App. 277, 86 S.W.2d
570 (1935). Contra Trumbaturi v. Katz & Besthoff, 180 La. 915, 158 So. 16 (1934)
(holding that the Louisiana Civil Code required the druggist to inquire as to the purpose of
the purchase of the drug and failure to do so was a breach of duty owed the woman who died
as a result of swallowing it).
156. 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217 (1965).
157. Id. at 53, 390 S.W.2d at 219.
158. Id. at 53-54, 390 S.W.2d at 219.




sorry. Louis has beat me enough," and jumped to her death from a
bridge."0 1
Her family sued Montesi for causing her suicide. In affirming
dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action, the court said:
We think that the facts alleged here establish an efficient, intervening,
and unforeseeable cause. Thus, the proximate, or legal, cause of the harm
complained of was the voluntary and free act of the deceased in taking her
own life. Her voluntary act was an abnormal thing, which supersedes
defendant's liability. 6 2
The disintegration of the rationale supporting Sponatski and Salsedo
occurred for two reasons: Legal realists constantly attacked the notion of
an objective cause which could be used to assess legal (and moral)
culpability. 63 This attack began to succeed in courts throughout the
country in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 16 4 Causation became an issue of
policy, in which the community attached liability based on its sense of what
was right, rather than on a sense of an objective legal cause. This different
understanding of cause also led to a reconciliation of the differing legal
responses to suicide in insurance cases and civil cases. In adopting a rule
permitting recovery if the person was insane at the time of the suicide, the
courts reconciled variations in insurance law and worker's compensation
law, and created an avenue in which an individual's actions were more
integrated into a community. It permitted the community to make
161. Id.
162. Id. at 61, 390 S.W.2d at 222.
163. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924); L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). See M. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation,
reprinted in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
164. See G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980). In
1963, Justice Roger Traynor wrote the important opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Dean Prosser had led
the attack specifically on the issue of causation of suicide:
Some difficulty has arisen in cases where the injured person becomes insane
and commits suicide. Although there are cases to the contrary, it seems the better
view that when his insanity prevents him from realizing the nature of his act or
controlling his conduct, his suicide is to be regarded either as a direct result and no
intervening force at all, or as a normal incident of the risk, for which the defendant
will be liable. The situation is the same as if he should hurt himself during
unconsciousness or delirium brought on by the injury. But if the suicide is during a
lucid interval, when he is in full command of his faculties but his life has become
unendurable to him, it is agreed that his voluntary choice is an abnormal thing,
which supersedes the defendant's liability.
W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 49, at 273-74 (1955). Of course, the decision to attribute
the actions of one who committed suicide a result of delirium rather than a result of lucid,
voluntary choice is also an issue of policy.
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distinctions concerning the blameworthiness of the act of the person
committing suicide, and concerning the acts of other individuals and the
community itself.
Three cases decided between 1959 and 1961 opened the door for a
general rule for civil actions arising from suicide.'65 The cases cited the
previously ignored Restatement of Torts'66 and Dean Prosser167 in support
of the decisions. The courts also quickly bridged the chasm between
different theories of causation and between intentional and negligent acts
of the defendant.
In Cauverien v. DeMetz, 6 8 the New York court stated, "Upon this
complaint the wrong is alleged to be intentional, and therefore the
wrongdoer is responsible for the injuries directly caused even though they
may be beyond the limits of foreseeability."' 69 Suicide did not bar a cause
of action based on intentional tort. In Tate v. Canonica,70 the California
Court of Appeal held that "a cause of action for wrongful death results,
whether the suicide was committed in a state of insanity, or in response to
an irresistible impulse, or not," so long as an injury was intended.' 7' In
165. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960); Cauverien v. De
Metz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Orcutt v. Spokane
County, 58 Wash. 2d 846,364 P.2d 1102 (1961). Cf. Bogust v. Iverson, 10 Wis. 2d 129, 102
N.W. 2d 228 (1960) (holding that school guidance counselor could not have known
sufficient facts to impose a duty on him to prevent suicide).
166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 455 (1934).
Acts Done During Insanity Caused by Negligent Conduct
If the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of
another as to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by
the other to himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity
(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or
risk of harm involved therein, or
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity
which deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with
reason.
This section remained the same in the Second Restatement.
167. See supra note 164.
168. 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
169. Id. at 148-49, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
170. 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
171. Id. at 908, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 36. Two months after deciding Tate, the same division
of the same court decided Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5
Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960), a workers' compensation case in which it stated:
In most cases it is unrealistic to determine that suicide is an "independent"
intervening cause. A conscious volition to produce death does not necessarily make
the suicide a separate agency unconnected with the primary injury, nor an
intentionally or wilfully inflicted self-injury. The force set in motion by the original
injury may be, and in most cases is, the real cause of the act of suicide. Such forces
are employment connected.
Id. at 825, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
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1961, the Supreme Court of Washington, in Orcutt v. Spokane County, 72
held that a cause of action alleging suicide and predicated on negligence
was permitted. 73
Since these cases, the legal response to civil actions concerning suicide
has gone far beyond the Restatement's limitations. 174 While most courts
have retained a concept of insanity, or uncontrollable impulse or mental
illness of the deceased 7 5 as a way of limiting liability through causation,
this limitation has been circumvented by expanding the affirmative duty of
care to prevent suicide.
Initially, the autonomy of an independent actor's action was viewed as
barring the imposition of an affirmative duty of care to prevent another's
suicide. For example, in Bogust v. Iverson,' the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin concluded, as a matter of law, that a school guidance counselor
could not have foreseen the suicide of a student he was counseling,
particularly since he was not trained in medicine or psychiatry.177
As a result, the focus shifted to those who were trained in medicine and
172. 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
173. Id. at 847, 364 P.2d at 1102.
174. Three articles documenting the changes are Schwartz, Civil Liability for
Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 25 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1971);
Comment, Civil Liability for Suicide: An Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 573; Note, Civil Liability for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, 12 Lov. L.A.L.
REV. 967 (1979).
175. See, e.g., Grant v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 790, 798, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 49 (1978) ("And no authority has come to our attention holding that one's death
following a wrongful act causing a mental condition proximately resulting in an
uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, is not actionable." (emphasis added)); see also
Jarvis v. Stone, 517 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. I11. 1981) (failure to allege decedent's insanity at
time he committed suicide requires dismissal for failure to state a cause of action); Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39, col. I., reporting on the settlement in Stephens v. New York City
Transit Auth., No. 40246-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), in which Stephens jumped onto a subway
track in an attempt to commit suicide. Stephens' legs were severed, but he survived. He
sued, alleging that the motorman negligently failed to stop the train in time to prevent the
injuries. Note, however, that if the defendant's actions are deemed intentional, there is no
requirement that the decedent commit suicide while insane. Tate, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 909,
5 Cal. Rptr. at 36 ("[W]e believe that, in a case where the defendant intended, by his
conduct, to cause serious mental distress or serious physical suffering, and does so, and such
mental distress is shown by the evidence to be 'a substantial factor in bringing about' the
suicide, a cause of action for wrongful death results, whether the suicide was committed in a
state of insanity, or in response to an irresistible impulse, or not." (citation omitted)). One
writer has said, "It is submitted that these few decisions which disregard the rather artificial
dichotomy between sanity and insanity-induced suicide are arguably more realistic and
constitute, en masse, a powerful trendsetter." Annotation, Liability of One Causing
Physical Injuries as a Result of Which Injured Party Attempts or Commits Suicide, 77
A.L.R.3d 311, 315 (1977).
176. 10 Wis. 2d 129, 102 N.W.2d 228 (1960).
177. Id. at 134, 102 N.W.2d at 230.
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psychiatry. Courts began holding psychiatrists and hospitals liable for
acting ineffectively in preventing hospitalized persons diagnosed as sui-
cidal from committing suicide.1 78 Commentators began pressing for the
imposition of legal standards of reasonable care in preventing "foresee-
able" suicides. 7 9 By the mid-1970s, one article stated, "suicide cases
account[ed] for a significant percentage of all psychiatric malpractice
litigation." 8 '
This affirmative duty to prevent suicide was presented as follows:
If those charged with the care and treatment of a mentally disturbed
patient know of facts from which they could reasonably conclude that the
patient would be likely to harm himself in the absence of preclusive
measures, then they must use reasonable care under the circumstances to
prevent such harm. 8 '
The psychiatrist's duty to a suicidal patient was later expanded to include a
duty to prevent the suicide of a nonhospitalized patient.'82 The limitations
of foreseeability also became more limited as the duties of care were
expanded to other defendants with a relationship with the person who had
committed suicide.
Jailers were charged with an affirmative duty to prevent their
prisoners from committing suicide.' In Falkenstein v. City of Bis-
178. Szostak v. State, 20 A.D.2d 828,247 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); Kent
v. Whitaker, 58 Wash. 2d 569, 364 P.2d 556 (1961).
179. See Perr, Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 427 (1960); Litman, Medical-Legal Aspects of Suicide, 6 WASHBURN L. REV. 395
(1967). See also Schwartz, Civil Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and
Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 245-51 (1971) and articles noted therein.
180. Klein & Glover, Psychiatric Malpractice, 6 INT'L J. L. & PSYCH. 131, 141
(1983); Swenson, Legal Liability for a Patient's Suicide, 14 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1986).
181. Meier v. Ross General Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420,424,445 P.2d 519,522-23, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 903, 906-07 (1968). See Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, 67 Cal. 2d
465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967) (holding prejudicial error to instruct jury that
in order to find for plaintiffs, jury had to conclude that decedent's suicide not due to any
voluntary action on her part); see also San Antonio Express-News, Oct. 12, 1987, at 12-A,
col. 3 (reporting $1.3 million jury award to widow of patient who hanged himself while
receiving treatment at drug rehabilitation center).
182. Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978).
183. Dezort v. Hinsdale, 35 I11. App. 3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468 (1976); McBride v.
State, 52 Misc. 2d 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Ct. Cl. 1967), aff'd, 30 A.D.2d 1025, 294
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1968); Washington Post, July 9, 1986, at C7, col. 1 (reporting on million
dollar verdict against District of Columbia for suicide of prisoner); Boston Globe, July 12,
1987, at 51, col. 5 (Rhode Island Legislature voted to pay interest in judgment in case in
which prison officials held liable for injuries suffered in failed suicide attempt); see 1 BNA
CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 302 (1986) (listing damage awards in recent jail suicide cases). See
generally Note, Custodial Suicide Cases: An Analytical Approach to Determine Liability
for Wrongful Death, 62 B.U.L. REV. 177 (1982) (listing cases).
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marck,8" the court concluded that the jury properly found a breach of duty
in the City's failure to properly observe and supervise the prisoner, or in its
use of "the Hole" as the cell in which the intoxicated Kevin Falkenstein was
placed. 18 5 The absence of evidence that the City knew or should have
known of Falkenstein's suicidal tendencies was irrelevant.
The problem of prisoner suicides also led to legislative solutions. In
1985, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed an act requiring
"lockup facilities" to be constructed so as to prevent suicides, and requiring
that "[e] ach occupied cell within such a lockup facility shall be physically
and visibly checked by a police officer or other lockup personnel every
fifteen minutes."1 86
Affirmative duties to prevent suicide were also extended to employ-
ers18 7 and to religious counselors.188 In Bednar v. United States Lines,
Inc., 89 the court used broad langauge in holding an employer liable for a
seaman/employee's death by suicide:
If the Master had any remaining doubt that Bednar was not in a
condition to properly care for himself at sea, it should certainly have been
resolved when the Chief Officer found Bednar nude, "vague," and writing a
confusing note about his own suicide. Thus, the situation presented is both
one in which a reasonable man should have realized that Bednar was
suffering from psychiatric problems and that this condition was serious and
also one in which the communications sent by the crew showed that the
crew was actually aware of this condition.
184. 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978).
185. Id. at 792.
186. 1985 Mass. Laws Acts ch. 207. See also Boston Globe, Dec. 8, 1986, at 21, col. 2
(reporting on request of police chiefs to delay implementation of bill and that $12 million
had been appropriated to implement requirements).
187. Bednar v. United States Lines, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1973). In
three other cases involving allegations that a person in a relation to another failed to prevent
the other's suicide, courts have split on whether an affirmative duty exists. In State ex rel.
Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1968), the court found actionable a suicide
"caused" by the intentional abuse of process by two justices of the peace and their deputy
sheriffs. In McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 461 A.2d 123 (1983), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that an attorney owed no affirmative duty to prevent the
suicide of her client. Most recently, in Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.
1985), the court of appeals held that parents whose son had shot and killed himself at school
had alleged a prima facie case against the school, several employees, the city and a police
officer under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
188. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987), review granted, 747 P.2d 527, 243 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1988). See Note,
Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 137 (1986); Note, Religious Counseling - Parents Allowed to Pursue Suit Against
Church and Clergy for Son's Suicide, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213.
189. 360 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
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It is also clear from the facts presented that the crew was aware that a
man in Bednar's condition should be placed under constant observation.90
The transformation of the affirmative duty to prevent another's
suicide from a limited status-based duty to a generalized duty was
completed in Sneider v. Hyatt Corporation."9' Mrs. Sneider checked into a
Hyatt hotel in Atlanta late in the evening on February 6, 1974. At
approximately noon the next day she jumped from the twenty-first floor to
her death.192 The court refused to grant defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the hotel owed a duty of care to its guests to prevent
their suicide.'93 It declined to utilize the general common law rule of no
duty to rescue by asserting that a special relation existed between the hotel
and its guests. 94 However, its language was broader in scope, and the court
noted that pertinent facts which the jury would need to ascertain were the
"decedent's inebriated condition when she arrived at the hotel, her lack of
luggage, alleged telephone inquiries regarding decedent's whereabouts,
and the alleged failure of defendants' employees to take any preventive
action when they observed Mrs. Sneider wandering in a confused condition
on the twenty-first floor. .... ,,195
The decision attempted to limit its framework to depend on the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Its recitation of the disputed
and undisputed facts indicates that the legal test will be minimal. The true
test of the affirmative duty to prevent suicide will be a factual determina-
tion by the jury.
Decisions concerning civil liability for causing or failing to prevent
suicide first created a legally constructed vision of autonomous, deperson-
alized individuals whose actions were largely independent of each other
and the community. This led to a restrictive understanding of duties owed
to others, and a limited, objective view of causation. The attack on
causation led to a reevaluation of notions of duty and personality. It also
permitted courts to reinfuse notions of moral responsibility into the civil
law. Sanity had long been used in criminal law and insurance law to assign
culpability, and using insanity in civil liability cases permitted the courts to
190. Id. at 1316 (emphasis in original).
191. 390 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also Note, The Role of Law in Suicide
Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment- A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39
STAN. L. REV. 929, 945-53 (1987) (arguing in favor of a general civil duty to report all
suicide threats).
192. 390 F. Supp. at 977.
193. Id. at 981.
194. Id. at 979.
195. Id. at 978.
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view the person who had committed suicide less as a legal actor and more as
a human being. An understanding of the interdependence of individuals
and the community changed the direction of tort law and led to a rejection
of the Mill paradigm in suicide cases.
III. SUICIDE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The middle road is the only one that does not lead to Rome. 96
As stated earlier, no court has explicitly created a constitutional right
to commit suicide. 197 There is no need to so explicitly state. The same result
can be achieved by working on descending levels of generality. Millian
individualism is the foundation for the generalized right of privacy or
autonomy. This right of privacy, in turn, is the source for the more concrete
right to die. From the generalized right to die came the more specific right
to refuse extraordinary medical treatment. From that right came the right
to refuse any medical treatment, and from this right there was created a
right to refuse food, water and other necessities. Finally, inexorably, there
is a dimly recognized right to commit suicide, which is justified by resort to
ascending levels of generality.
Rights discourse over the past twenty-five years has advanced a
constitutional philosophy of autonomy, of choices unencumbered by
community views, and of freedom from community (state) constraints.
This constitutional philosophy has been advanced by not recognizing
persons as individuals within a community, or as persons within history."9 8
196. A. SCHOENBERG, Foreword to THREE SATIRES FOR MIXED CHORUS 3 (Universal
ed. 1953) (translated from German original).
197. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
198. No better argument can be found than in Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the
Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327
(1981 ), which emphasizes the natural autonomy-based right of rational agents to choose
their own life plan without regard to the desires and wishes of other rational agents or the
state.
A different view of what a person is can be found in 0. SACKS, THE MAN WHO
MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 39 (1985). Sacks is a
neurologist, and discusses the case history of an amnesiac named Jimmie. Jimmie's
alcoholism destroyed some neuron in mammillary bodies in his brain, resulting in
retrograde amnesia, known as Karsakov's Syndrome. As told by Sacks:
I have known Jimmie now for nine years and neuropsychologically, he has not
changed in the least. He still has the severest, most devastating Korsakov's, cannot
remember isolated items for more than a few seconds, and has a dense amnesia
going back to 1945. But humanly, spiritually, he is at times a different man
altogether - no longer fluttering, restless, bored, and lost, but deeply attentive to
the beauty and soul of the world, right in all the Kierkegaardian categories - the
aesthetic, the moral, the religious, and the dramatic. I had wondered, when I first
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By masking persons as "rights-holders," courts have avoided confronting
the chasm between persons in a community created by autonomy-based
rights. The court-created limits on these rights are disintegrating as the
Mill paradigm is pushed to its logical limits. Courts must sooner or later
acknowledge that such "rights talk" means an acceptance of a constitu-
tional right to commit suicide.
Before Griswold v. Connecticut1" and Roe v. Wade 0° arguments in
support of a right to die, as a more specific aspect of a constitutional right to
privacy or autonomy, were rarely advanced and, when advanced, not
accepted. When a patient's life was in imminent danger, the argument that
he or she had either a common law right of bodily self-determination or a
constitutionally-based right to practice his or her religion was not ac-
cepted. 10' Similarly, the state could prevent acts of suicide or self-
destruction:
It is true that the successful suicide is no longer within the reach of the
law, but it does not follow that self-destruction is a legally protected right of
individuals ...
There is in the law no sanction for self-destruction, and certainly there
is no right on the part of anyone to use public highways for risking or
courting or seeking such self-destruction. 2
met him, if he were not condemned to a sort of "Humean" froth, a meaningless
fluttering on the surface of life, and whether there was any way of transcending the
incoherence of his Humean disease. Empirical science told me there was not - but
empirical science, empiricism, takes no account of the soul, no account of what
constitutes and determines personal being. Perhaps there is a philosophical as well
as a clinical lesson here: that in Karsakov's, or dementia, or other such catastrophes,
however great the organic damage and Humean dissolution, there remains the
undiminished possibility of reintegration by art, by communion, by touching the
human spirit: and this can be preserved in what seems at first a hopeless state of
neurological devastation.
See also V. GROSSMAN, LIFE AND FATE 404-11 (1985) (what makes us human, what makes
us continue to fight evil with good, is "a mad, senseless kindness").
199. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law prohibiting use or sale of contraceptives is
unconstitutional).
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (laws prohibiting or regulating abortion are
unconstitutional).
201. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical
Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965). Cf. In re Brooks, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965) (patient not in imminent danger of losing life); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d 27,252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962) (same). See generally Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving
Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975).
202. Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 52, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382 (1969) (motorcyclist
has no constitutional right to ride without wearing a helmet). To similar effect, see Mayock
v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969)
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This kind of statement was made anachronistic after In re Quinlan 0 3
The Quinlan case opened for consideration the kinds of deaths which might
be judicially approved. It eliminated the importance of a communal vision,
by making cases about death not cases different in kind from other cases,
but only different in degree. While removing legal boundaries, it created
new boundaries between the self and the community. This legal redistrict-
ing devalues a community's vision of itself and serves to segregate the
individual from the community.'" In conjunction with Roe v. Wade, the
Quinlan case also altered the legal understanding of a person."'
In Palko v. Connecticut,2" Justice Cardozo stated that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment included rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."20 7 Justice Frankfurter used this concept of
a communal understanding, and an understanding of history, in attempt-
ing to "balance" an individual's rights with a community's interests. 8
These constructions of constitutional decisionmaking relied on a view of a
(rejecting claim of right to physically harm self in response to command given by God);
State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969) (motorcyclist has no constitutional right to ride
without wearing a helmet); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (rejecting claim of constitutional right to handle poisonous
snakes as part of a religious ceremony).
203. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Karen Ann Quinlan
was in a vegetative comatose state after mixing drugs and alcohol. Her parents requested
that the artificial respirator be removed. Since Karen Ann was an adult and the hospital and
doctor wanted to protect themselves from civil or criminal liability, the legal process was
invoked to "solve" the perceived conflicts. This resulted in the recognition of a constitutional
right to die as part of a more general right to privacy, or autonomy.
Quinlan is the seminal case exemplifying and delineating a constitutional "right to
die" as an aspect of the right to privacy. The phrase "right to die" was first used in In re
Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619, 623 (1973).
204. The constitutional jurisprudence on death penalty cases is another battle
between recognizing the death penalty as different in kind from other criminal punishments
and considering it as different only in degree. This may be why some capital punishment
litigators continue to litigate even when their client requests them to end litigation; the
client requesting this is sometimes believed to be insane.
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973) (acknowledging that a right to
privacy or autonomy to choose abortion requires that a fetus not be deemed a legal
"person"). See supra note 203. One scholar has said that Quinlan breaks down one of the
last "vacuum-bounded" categories, that of life and death. Mensch, The History of
Mainstream Legal Thought, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 183 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). In reflecting on this "jurisprudence of life and death,"
Professor George Fletcher has stated, "It is not entirely clear whether we should use the
term 'person,' 'human being,' or 'live person' to state what it is to be one of us .... What is
at stake is not life, but the acquisition of a legal personality." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 373 (1978).
206. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
207. Id. at 325.
208. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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known community which created historically-based normative standards
for the community. Roe and Quinlan rejected community standards in
favor of an individual's constitutionally-protected right to privacy, a right
to create one's own normative standards. Community standards were
trumped by individual standards given constitutional protection, regard-
less of the conflict between the two standards. A person lived in a
community but was exempt from its norms which inhibited personal
choice. The result is an empty, formulaic "balancing."
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court attempted to limit the
reach of the Mill paradigm by asserting state interests in Quinlan-like
cases. It accepted as constitutionally protected an individual's autonomy-
based right to privacy. It also attempted to limit the extent of this right by
concluding that while these cases were not different in kind from other
individual rights cases, there were clearly ways in which the state could
object to methods and choices made by individuals when deciding to die.
The issue was the degree to which the state could object to methods and
choices made by individuals when deciding to die. In other words, the issue
was the degree to which the state must acquiesce in an individual's choice
of death. As stated in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, °9 these interests were:
(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties;
(3) the prevention of suicide; and
(4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.210
209. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
210. Id. at 741,370 N.E.2d at 425. Even in this case, the validity of the state interest in
preventing suicide was questioned:
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any
discussion. In the case of the competent adult's refusing medical treatment such an
act does not necessarily constitute suicide since (i) in refusing treatment the
patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the extent
that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set the death
producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own death. Furthermore,
the underlying State interest in this area lies in the prevention of irrational self-
destruction. What we consider here is a competent, rational decision to refuse
treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure or
preservation of life.
Id. at 743 n. 11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11. This, of course, conveniently sidesteps how a
community chooses to define sanity. For example, a number of states permit a person to be
involuntarily committed if the person is "suicidal." The term "suicidal" is defined as
indicative of a mental illness. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 27, at
Appendix (listing statutes). This quote also indicates the remoteness of Joseph Saikewicz
from the legal decision about his life. He is not a competent person making a "rational"
decision. He is, however, still a person.
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It concluded that these asserted interests, when "balanced" against
Saikewicz's right to privacy, did not permit the court to order Saikewicz to
undergo surgery.
Joseph Saikewicz was mentally retarded and had lived in state
institutions for fifty years. His rights were not asserted by him, but by
another, allegedly on "substituted judgment" or "subjective grounds."
The court stated:
[W] e realize that an inquiry into what a majority of people would do in
circumstances that truly were similar assumes an objective viewpoint not
far removed from a "reasonable person" inquiry. While we recognize the
value of this kind of indirect evidence, we should make it plain that the
primary test is subjective in nature-that is, the goal is to determine with as
much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the individual
involved.211
The court then cited a commentator to support its argument that when the
person's wishes are unknown, it must act as if it is obeying the wishes of a
rational, reasonable and competent person. 2 '
Notwithstanding the court's protestations, the test formulated does
not consider Joseph Saikewicz's wishes. It considers his "needs," such as
avoiding the pain surgery would cause, pain he could not understand
because he was highly retarded and noncommunicative. 13
The Saikewicz opinion is replete with myths about the mentally
retarded. It attempts to make the "normal" person sanguine about its
opinion by emphasizing the differentness of the retarded. This case is about
"them," not about "us." These myths and soothing reassurances permit
the "rest" of the community a chance to refuse to acknowledge Joseph
Saikewicz as a member of the community, as a fellow human being. In
pretending to defer to Joseph Saikewicz's right to choose his own life plan,
as if that were the issue, we choose to implement a plan we think best suits
him, but actually best suits us. Joseph Saikewicz is not like the rest of us,
and is thus not a part of us.2 14
211. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430 (footnote omitted).
212. Id. at 750 n.l1, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.ll.
213. In fact, the court itself had previously stated Saikewicz was only verbally
noncommunicative. He communicated with others through gestures, grunts and physical
contact. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
214. See Burt, The Ideal of Community in the Work ofthe President's Commission, 6
CARDOZO L. REv. 267 (1984) wherein the author observed:
But here is the central problem: There is no room for severely impaired
children or adults in a society where it is permissible for others always to behave in a
narrowly self-interested way, always to deny any moral imperative for self-sacrifice
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The Saikewicz structure was universally adopted.21 This structure
permitted distinctions between letting persons die and condoning euthana-
sia. Three recent cases have claimed to rely on this structure to expand or
alter the "right to die," with the consequence of showing the structure
hollow.216
The New Jersey Supreme Court declared in In re Conroy,2" that
feeding Claire Conroy through a nasogastric tube was medical treatment,
and removal of the tube would be guided by the same factors which guided
the initial use of the tube. 1 s Although Ms. Conroy had never stated
whether she would have wanted the tube removed, and was unable to say
now, the court began its discussion by saying, "The starting point in
analyzing whether life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or with-
in the service of others, always to prefer self-serving actions at the expense of
communal bonds.
Id. at 281. See generally Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence:
The Demise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2
J. CONT. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1986).
215. Battling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); In
re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. 1980); Satzv. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Leach
v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). See also infra note 216.
One of many attempts to negotiate through these cases without noting the irony is
found at Note, Balancing the Right to Die with Competing Interests: A Socio-Legal
Enigma, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 109 (1985). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983).
216. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Brophy is the most recent case, decided in
September 1986. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decided that nourishment of Paul Brophy through tubes could be halted in
accordance with statements made by Brophy before he suffered an aneurysm. The court
quoted Mill, and stated that its decision was based in part on the "recognition of these
fundamental principles of individual autonomy .. " 398 Mass. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at
633. In Brophy, unlike Conroy or Bouvia, there was a dissent that explicitly confronted the
paradox of the Mill paradigm. Justice Lynch said, under the majority's rationale, "the
Saikewicz 'balancing' test is all but chimerical once it has been discerned what the
individual's choice would be." Id. at 445, 497 N.E.2d at 642. He also urged the majority to
choose between a constitutional right to die and the interest in preventing suicide. Id. at 446-
47,497 N.E.2d at 642-43 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Justice Lynch's dissent is important, for it
requires a response. It will not do simply to cite Mill as support for a right to privacy, or a
right to autonomy. Whether any court will respond directly to this challenge remains to be
seen.
217. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
218. Id. at 348-54, 486 A.2d at 1222-25. Claire Conroy died before the decision, but
the court decided to structure a "solution" to this kind of case.
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drawn from an incompetent patient is to determine what rights a
competent patient has to accept or reject medical care. '
The normal, the valued, is the competent person. The "abnormal"
person is devalued. As stated by one commentator:
By invoking a competent person as its starting point, and insisting that
Ms. Conroy be given "the same rights" as if she were competent, the court
implicitly revealed its devaluation of, and its invidious discriminatory
attitude toward, incompetent people. In effect, the court said that compe-
tent people are the norm in this society and incompetent people should be
treated as if they could attain - or at least could approximate - this
highly valued norm.220
In effect, the court is using the Mill paradigm to conceal its use of "norms"
and standards contrary to standards expressed in other areas of law. It is
the Mill paradigm with a normative kick.
This "devaluation" of the incompetent person is also found in the
court's treatment of the way in which Ms. Conroy's decision is to be made.
It advocates first applying a "subjective" standard: "The question is not
what a reasonable or -average person would have chosen to do under the
circumstances but what the particular patient would have done if able to
choose for himself."22' If a patient's intent can not be ascertained,222
nourishment may be withheld under either a "limited-objective" or
"objective" standard. The former requires "some trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker
is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens of the patient's continued life
with the treatment outweigh the benefit of that life for him." 2 3 The latter
test requires "the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should
clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from
life." 224
219. Id. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221.
220. Withholding Nutrition and Mistrusting Nurturance: The Vocabulary of In re
Conroy, 2 IssUEs IN L. & MED. 317, 319 (1987).
It was the Tennessee Supreme Court's conclusion that Margaret Lancaster's suicide
was "abnormal" which freed from civil liability a man who had tortured and beaten her.
Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217 (1965). See supra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text.
221. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
222. See Burt, supra note 220, at 319, for an examination of the court's use of
subjective to include evaluation by others of Claire Conroy's "loss of dignity," her
"dependence," and her "humiliation."
223. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. When the court says "for him" it
appears clear that it is referring to Claire Conroy, which is a remarkably depersonalized
way in which to speak about her.
224. Id. at 366,486 A.2d at 1232. This is also a component of the limited objective test.
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Both objective standards subsume the person of Claire Conroy. Her
life depends on what others think they would like to have done to them
without being in her position. A factor to be considered is the pain she
would suffer if the treatment continued,225 but it appears that the pain
considered was that of others forced to see her as a person.
Gone too are the alleged countervailing state interests: "On balance,
the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing
state interests, and competent persons generally are permitted to refuse
medical treatment, even at the risk of death." '226 Specifically, the interest in
preventing suicide is rendered meaningless:
It may be contended that in conjunction with its general interest in
preserving life, this state has a particular legislative policy of preventing
suicide. This state interest in protecting people from direct and purposeful
self-destruction is motivated by, if not encompassed within, the state's
more basic interest in preserving life. Thus, it is questionable whether it is a
distinct state interest worthy of independent consideration.
In any event, declining life-sustaining medical treatment may not
properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide.
227
This approach was heartily endorsed in Bouvia v. Superior Court.22 8
Elizabeth Bouvia, declared mentally competent, requested that a hospital
be ordered to remove a nasogastric tube. Ms. Bouvia was a quadriplegic
and suffered from cerebral palsy. She was not mentally impaired. 22 9 The
court declared the feeding tube medical treatment, which Ms. Bouvia had
an absolute right to refuse.2 30 It also refused to consider her actions suicide,
The court further noted that "the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life
with the treatment" should be such that the treatment would be inhumane. Id.
225. Id. The problem is that Ms. Conroy's doctors disagreed whether she was feeling
pain. Id. at 338,486 A.2d at 1217. See also Burt, supra note 220, at 324 ("The standards of
'pain' or of 'individual privacy' and 'dignity' have no reliably objective content; they are
virtual invitations to paste fictitious attributes on a 'person' who never existed as such.").
226. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225. The constitutional right of self-
determination replaced the privacy rationale of Quinlan. Id. at 348,486 A.2d at 1223. This
change, at best, is semantic. At worst, it is an excuse to extend the scope of a right to die, and
in a number of these cases, it broadens the power of the guardian to choose death.
227. Id. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1224 (citations omitted).
228. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). See Note, The Suicide Trap:
Bouvia v. Superior Court and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 21 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 219 (1987); Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse
Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 707 (1987) (discussing Bouvia not as a suicide
case, but at a level of generality of refusing lifesaving treatment).
229. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
230. Id. ("Petitioner sought only to enforce a right which was exclusively hers and
over which neither the medical profession nor the judiciary have any veto power.").
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while alluding to the likelihood of a right to commit suicide.231 After all, she
had no "life" anyway:
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been diminished to
the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. She,
as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may
consider her existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so conclud-
ing. If her right to choose may not be exercised because there remains to
her, in the opinion of a court, a physician or some committee, a certain
arbitrary number of years, months, or days, her right will have lost its value
and meaning.
Who shall say what the minimum amount of available life must be?
Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to 20 days, if
such life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose
gone? As in all matters lines must be drawn at some point, somewhere, but
that decision must ultimately belong to the one whose life is in issue.2"2
The Mill paradigm was intended to give an individual a right of choice
regarding self-determination. It is a delusion to think that such choices
exist without others. Elizabeth Bouvia's family had disappeared, and in its
stead is a court approving her decision that life is meaningless. The halting
methods used in law to make her life meaningful by making all of us see her
as a member of our community are swept away. Elizabeth Bouvia was
231. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306 ("Overlooking the fact that a desire to
terminate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy, we find no
substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion [that she intended to commit
suicide].").
232. Id. at 1142-43,225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05. To the same effect, though through the
veil of substituted judgment, is Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417,
497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). Balancing in this context is demonstrated to be a meaningless
incantation, a ritual without purpose or effect.
One attempt to make balancing work in an unusual situation is found in New York
State Ethics Opinion 486 (June 19, 1978). A lawyer requested an answer to the question,
"May a lawyer disclose his client's expressed intention to commit suicide?" In a tortured
three page answer, the author concludes that one must balance the law's interest in the
preservation of life with the preservation of client confidences and secrets. The author's
answer to this question is a qualified yes. Suicide, or death, is no longer an issue that is
different in kind, but a matter of degree, particularly the degree to which the lawyer
"reasonably believes that such disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from taking his
life." Id. We are no longer "[p]ersons speak[ing] to persons, heart unmasked to heart," J.
NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 167 (1976), but reasonable lawyers speaking
to unreasonable (?) clients. We are bound to legal concepts defining and limiting our status.
We have lost ourselves in law. Cf CALIF. CODE EvID. § 1024 (West Ann. 1966) ("There is
no privilege [of psychotherapist-patient] if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to




wrapped in a legal cocoon where no one could touch her and she could touch
no one.
The particular claim of a right to commit suicide has only arisen in
prisoner hunger strike cases." 3' In Von Holden v. Chapman,"' In re
Caulk,2 35 and State ex rel. White v. Narick,236 the courts concluded that
hunger strikes were a method of committing suicide and permitted the
state to prevent the prisoners' deaths. The Gourts did not adopt the Mill
paradigm, implicitly recognizing that the decisions would be insupportable
if the paradigm were adopted. That was precisely the rationale adopted by
Justice Douglas' dissent in In re Caulk. Interestingly, he chose to quote
from the same passage of Mill as quoted as the beginning of this article.2 37
In Zant v. Prevatte,38 the Georgia Supreme Court followed a
different path. While the court characterized Prevatte's right as one to
refuse medical treatment, in effect it granted Prevatte his right to kill
himself.2"9 Three factors appear important to the court's decision. First,
Prevatte had once been sentenced to die which seems to have vitiated any
state interest in preserving his life.240 Second, Prevatte had no "dependents
who rely on him for their means of livelihood."241 Third, Prevatte was
deemed "sane and rational."2 " These assertions permitted the court to
endorse Prevatte's request to starve himself to death.
The law protected Prevatte from receiving any hope from or reconcili-
ation with the community. His death sentence, even though reversed,
marked him forever as an outcast; there was no return from exile. The
court, in noting that Prevatte was not a breadwinner, failed to answer more
233. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); In re Caulk, 125 N.H.
226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982). See also Note, The
Effect of Incarceration on the Right to Die, 11 N.E.J. OF CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 395
(1985); Note, Should a Hunger-Striking Prisoner Be Allowed to Die, 25 B.C.L. REV. 423,
431 n. 126 (1984) (listing cases found through LEXIS search). Cf. San Antonio Light, Aug.
3, 1987, at 4, cols. 4-5 (reporting refusal by West Virginia prison officials to permit prisoner
serving a life sentence without possibility of parole to die in order to donate organs).
234. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
235. 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984).
236. 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
237. In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 236, 480 A.2d 93, 100 (1984) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
238. 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
239. Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17.
240. Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716. Recall Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356
(1816), in which Jewett's scheduled execution did not lessen the state's interest in
criminally sanctioning Bowen for encouraging Jewett to hang himself.
241. Zant, 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
242. Id. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. See also Podgers, "Rational Suicide" Raises
Patient Rights Issue, 66 A.B.A. J. 1499 (1980).
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important questions: Does Prevatte have a family, or friends or acquaint-
ances? Is he a man without personal relationships? This does not matter to
the court; Prevatte is alone.
In creating a right of autonomy, the state courts purport to dignify the
individual. Instead, such a right cuts off the individual from other members
of the community. It removes the individual and substitutes a "rights-
holder," which the court can then use to justify its own prescriptions. We
fail to see the lessons from other areas of law. A person is a person, not a
legal personality.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Mill paradigm is becoming the prism through which suicides will
be viewed. The separation of the self from others is becoming complete. 43
The vision of a community with substantive ideals and hopes is replaced
with a collection of atomistic individuals who impose their goals, through
law, upon the community. In this situation, an ideal of reconciliation or
hope for and from the community can no longer exist. 4"
We become individuals tied to no one and to nothing. We shall become
like Camus' Jean Baptiste Clamence:
Then please tell me what happened to you one night on the quays of the
Seine and how you managed never to risk your life. You yourself utter the
words that for years have never ceased echoing through my nights and that
I shall at last say through your mouth: "0 young woman, throw yourself
into the water again so that I may a second time have the chance of saving
both of us!" A second time, eh, what a suggestion! Just suppose, cher
maitre, that we should be taken literally? We'd have to go through with it.
243. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction
and Conceptions ofthe Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (1984) (attempting to give meaning to
a "self" without invoking the self/other separation of classical liberal thought).
244. This ideal may have best been expressed in Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium
Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1947), in which the issue was whether communications
between the physician and the decedent were privileged. Communications which would
have tended to disgrace the memory of the decedent could not be waived. The issue was
whether testimony concerning Stiles' death by suicide would disgrace his memory:
But since suicide is recognized by statute as a grave public wrong, death by his own
hand, unexplained, would class the deceased as a grave public offender. The
testimony sought to be elicited from the attending nurse and physician would tend
to establish that the deceased, by reason of his mental condition, was not responsible
for his act of self-destruction and would thus clear his memory of moral




Brr... ! The water's so cold! But let's not worry. It's too late now. It will
always be too late. Fortunately!245
We may know something about ourselves, but we seem condemned not to
do anything about it.
245. A. CAMUS, THE FALL 217 (Vintage ed. 1956).
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